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Introduction

Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable - the art of the next best.
Otto von Bismarck

A sense of pessimism regarding the state of democracy has become
increasingly prevalent in recent years. A 2014 essay in The Economist
voiced this perspective in the following terms:
Democracy is going through a difficult time. Where autocrats have been driven out
of office, their opponents have mostly failed to create viable democratic regimes.
Even in established democracies, flaws in the system have become worryingly
visible and disillusion with politics is rife. Yet just a few years ago democracy
looked as though it would dominate the world.'

As this quote suggests, some of this feeling of gloom stems from concerns regarding a decline in the qualiry of democracy in consolidated
democratic states. 1 Recent elections, such as those in the United States
and France, have demonstrated a willingness among many voters to
support candidates who articulate values and views hostile to democratic
practices. Surveys taken within consolidated democracies similarly have
identified growing anti-democratic sentiments among citizens. According
to the World Values Survey, to cite an example, one out of six Americans

' wWhat's Gone Wrong with Democracy." The Economist, March 1, 2.014, p. 47.
• Liihrmann, Mechkova, and Wilson Uune 2.6, 2.01 7), who analyze the democratic decline
thesis using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project, conclude that while there are
reasons to be worried about the decline of democracy, the decline in the average level of
democracy in the world is moderate and democraric decline is limited to certain countries,
and to certain domains within those countries. See www.washingtonpost.com/news/mon
key-cage/wp/ 2.0 J 7/06/26/is-democracy-on-thc-dccline-nor-as-much-as-some-pundits-wa
nt-you-to-believe/?utm_term=.4breebcofcf1.
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now approves of the idea of "having the army rule" the country (Foa and
Mounk 2015).
This same feeling of disillusionment regarding democracy extends to
countries emerging from violent conflict. Despite the efforts of the international community to promote democracy in post-<:ivil war states, very
few of these countries successfully have made the transition to stable,
liberal democracies. Skeptics wonder whether the efforts devoted to liberal peace building have produced any meaningful outcomes. Jarstad's
(2015, 18) observation that "the UN ambition to promote democratization via peace-building operations in post-<ivil war cases largely has
failed" provides one trenchant answer to this question. Some critics go
even further, asking pointed questions regarding both the methods and
goals of external democracy promotion.
One of our central objectives in this book is to address the sense of
pessimism that now exists regarding the political future of countries
emerging from civil war. 3 We do not take this task on out of some
misguided sense of optimism. Countries that have just fought civil wars
confront a number of chaJlenges, almost all of which constitute obstacles
to the development of democracy. The democratic record of this group of
countries is certainly less than perfect: some countries fail to make
a transition to democracy in the years we analyze, others do make
a transition but experience democratic backsliding, and in yet others
democracy remains tenuous.
The point we seek to emphasize is instead that a number of countries do
make a transition to democracy - minimalist democracy - following the
end of their civil wars. Although minimalist democracy does not meet the
criteria for the form of liberal democracy that the international community hoped would take hold in countries emerging from civil war, this
form of conflict management can help provide post-conflict societies with
outcomes - security, participation, stability, predictability - that are
meaningful to them. To dismiss this change and fail to understand its
dynamics is to miss an opportunity to ascertain whether it might be
possible for more countries that are emerging from or have experienced
civil war to adopt- and perhaps later build on - minimalist democracy.

Liberia illustrates the capacity that postwar states have to achieve
a limited form of democracy. Once characterized as a failed state,
Liberia is today a democracy. This outcome was not a foregone conclusion. Following a period of growing restiveness in the 1970s, MasterSergeant Samuel Doe led a coup in 1980 that brought to power a brutal
and corrupt dictatorship. Nine years later, efforts by the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia to depose Doe resulted in civil war. During the
next fourteen years, several efforts were made to end the fighting. One of
these attempts yielded the 1996 Abuja Accord and a two-year reprieve in
the fighting during which warlord Charles Taylor was elected president.
However, it was not until 2003, following a renewed round of fighting,
Taylor's resignation as president, and the signing of the Accra
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, that the war in Liberia finally came to
an enduring end.
By the time peace was secured in Liberia, more than 200,000 people
had died and the state had joined the ranks of the poorest countries in the
world. The Economist (March 3, 2005) described the situation in postwar Liberia in the following terms:
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For t:his srudy, we follow the Correlates of War understanding of what defines a civil war.
To be considered a civil war, the conflict must meet the following criteria: (1) at least 1,000
battle deaths per year occur, (:z.) the national government is one of the actors in the war, (3)
there was effective resistance by the parties involved in t:he conflict, (4) the war took place
within a defined political unit.
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Practically nothing works in Liberia. There is no piped water, no functioning
justice system and the closest approximation co a middle class is 60,000 civil
servants who have hardly been paid in 14 years. There are 450,000 prosperous
and well-educated Liberians, but they live in America and show no sign of returning. Liberia is not even ranked on the UNDP's annual "human development
index," for lack of data. "We're fighting to get to the bottom of the list," says
the UN's lSpecial Representative for Liberial Mr Uacques] Klein. 4

Although the primary issue at stake in the conflict in Liberia was not
ethnicity, Taylor's history of exploiting ethnic tensions for his own advantage left the country balkanized. Add to this picture a number of other
challenges, including heavily armed groups and resentments stemming
from a history of social and ethnic exclusion. The collective effect of
these factors was to undermine the basis for stable governance in the
country, rendering the outlook for the emergence of democracy in
Liberia bleak indeed (Pham 2004).
As the case of Liberia makes clear, countries emerging from civil war
face numerous challenges once peace has been achieved. Central among
these is establishing "normal" politics, a system of nonviolent conflict
management that serves as the basis for institutionalizing and legitimating

~

"From Chaos, Order; Rebuilding Failed States." The Economist, March 5, :z.005, p. 46.
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state power. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the international
community has urged post-civil war states to adopt liberal democracy as
a means of managing conflict. External actors contend that free-and-fair
elections, equality before the law, a strong civil society, the protection of
individual rights and liberties, and a system of checks and balances among
the branches of the government make for an ideal means of managing
conflict and exercising governance. In an effort to promote the adoption
of these constituent components of liberal democracy, the international
community has provided significant support to states that are in the
process of ending their armed conflicts.
What has been the level of success associated with these efforts to
encourage the transition to liberal democracy? Based on our analysis of
the number of countries that have established a liberal democratic regime
following the end of their respective civil wars, the answer to this question
is "not at all successful." Focusing on the period r94 5-2006, only two of
the fifty-nine countries that experienced a period of peace following the
end of ninety civil wars made a complete transition to liberal democracy
within four years of the end of the war. 5 One of these countries, Costa
Rica, attained the status of a liberal democracy in r9 50, long before postconflict democracy programs were in vogue; the second, South Africa,
made the transition in 1996. Liberia, which made a transition to democracy in the years following the end of its civil war, is considered an
"electoral," "minimalist," or "Schumpeterian" democracy, rather than
a liberal democracy. 6

A number of factors account for the failure of liberal democracy to take
hold in countries emerging from civil war. These include difficult internal
conditions such as diminished social capital, the weakness of institutions
necessary to support democracy, and competing centers of legitimacy. The
strategies and resources external actors have brought to bear in these
efforts also have been identified as potentially problematic. Among
those who favor this line of thinking, Paris (2004, 6) observes that democratization efforts have the "potential to stimulate higher levels of societal
competition at the very moment (immediately following conflict) when
states are least equipped to contain such tensions within peaceful
bounds." Similarly, Flores and Nooruddin (20 c2), who find that elections
held during the first two years following a conflict's end increase the
likelihood that fighting will reignite, attribute this outcome to a dearth
of means by which to check the behavior of newly elected leaders and
assuage the concerns of opponents who fear retribution.
We share this skepticism about the potential for liberal democracy to
emerge in the wake of civil war. We identify a condition that is characteristic of states emerging from civil war that we argue poses a significant
obstacle to the transition to liberal democracy: a pervasive sense of insecurity among the elites of warring groups and their followers. We maintain that in the absence of measures designed to address this sense of
insecurity, democratization efforts arc likely to fail. More specifically,
we anticipate that civil war rivals will be particularly unwilling to embrace
the highly competitive institutions associated with liberal democracy. If,
however, wartime leaders are provided means of guaranteeing the physical and political survival of their communities, they should be more likely
to agree to the use of elections as a means of institutionalizing power.
Although this approach may not yield the liberal democracy favored by
the international community, it does enhance the probability that postcivil war states will adopt a minimalist or Schumpeterian form of democracy to manage conflict.
What types of assurances regarding their survival will help make civil
war rivals more amenable to considering a transition to minimalist democracy? We propose that power-sharing institutions can best accomplish this
task.7 A central component of many of the settlements designed to end civil

6

s We employ the Regimes in the World typology developed by Anna Liihrmann, Staffan
I. Lindberg, and .Marcus Tannenberg (2017) in our examinarion of wherher or not
countries established a liberal democratic regime w1thin a period of four years following
the end of a civil war; we examine only those years during that period in which the country
remains at peace. Our focus on a four-year period is based on the observation that iris
during this time that countries generally hold the first post-conflict elections and international actors' resources and energies are focused on assisting in the transition co democracy. The results of our evaluation arc m keeping w1cb those of Barnett, Fang, and Zurcher
(2014) who, using Freedom House data, find chat only two of the nineteen major peacebuilding operations launched by the international community since 1989 produced liberal
democracies.
6
A minimalist or Schumpeterian democracy is one in which, as defined by Joseph
Schumpccer, there 1s "free compcorion for a free vote." According co Luhrmann,
Lindberg, and Tannenberg (2017), electoral democracies are countries that hold defacto free-and-fair multiparty elections a~ well as achieving "a high level of institutional
guaranrees ... such as freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, an elected executive, and freedom of expression" (2). Liberal democracies, they note, muse meet the
foregoing criteria as well as prO\'ide for "effecrive legislative and Judicial oversight of the
executive, protection of civil liberties and the rule of law" (2).
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Security guarantees, often provided by other states or international peacekeeping force~,
have also been used to mitigate rebel groups' security concerns during post-<:ivil war
transition periods (see Walter 1999 and Fortna 2004). Because these measures do not
provide civil war rivals with assurances regarding access to and control of various
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wars, power-sharing measures distribute various elements of state power political, military, territorial, and economic- among rival groups with the
goal of enhancing security by ensuring that no single collectivity controls
all of the levers of state power. Power sharing guarantees contending
groups a role within the government, enhances their participation in
decision-making processes, and increases their access to public resources.
By performing these functions, power sharing helps secure civil war adversaries' commitment to the peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007).
The central claim we advance in this book is that power-sharing
institutions can reach beyond facilitating peace and help encourage
a transition to democracy following civil war. To be sure, we do not
argue that power-sharing arrangements usher in liberal democratic
regimes. Rather, we maintain that by confronting civil war adversaries'
insecurities, power-sharing institutions reduce the risk to rivals of considering the use of elections as a means of determining who will rule the
state. By mitigating some of the uncertainty associated with democracy,
power sharing can help persuade belligerents to consider adopting
a system of conflict management that is at least minimally democratic.
The notion that power-sharing measures can help pave the way for
democracy in post-civil war states has been strongly contested by some
scholars. Although willing to acknowledge that power sharing can help
stabilize the peace, a number of critics regard power-sharing measures as
constraining democratization. The research we present in the pages of this
book suggests that there are reasons to call into question elements of the
view that power sharing and democracy are fundamentally incompatible.
When considering all civil wars concluded between r945 and 2006, we
find that those states that adopted extensive power sharing, by which we
mean two or more of the four types of power sharing on which we focus
(political, military, territorial, and economic) have tended to be more
successful in achieving a minimalist form of democracy than those states
that abstained from sharing power among rival civil war actors.
As initial support for this proposition, we present Figure I.I. The figure
divides all civil wars concluded between 194 5 and 2006 that experienced at
least one year of post-conflict peace into two categories: those that included
extensive forms of power sharing in their civil war settlements and those
that did not. It then plots the proportion of cases in each category by
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FIGURE I. 1 Power sharing and post-civil war transition to minimalist
democracy, 1946-2006

whether or not the countries in question made a transition to minimalist
democracy in the years following the end of their respective civil wars.
As Figure I. I indicates, the majority of civil war settlements that did
not include extensive power sharing as part of the terms of the war-ending
settlement (62 percent) failed to make a transition to minimalist democracy in the years following the end of the conflicts that we analyze. When
extensive power sharing was specified within a settlement, the majority of
the cases (66 percent) made a transition to minimalist democracy. 8
Liberia's civil war settlements again serve as a useful means of illustrating our argument concerning the complementary relationship between
power sharing and the emergence of a limited form of democracy. The
Cotonou Agreement of July 1993 called only for political power sharing,
in the form of the Liberian National Transition Government, with representatives of the Interim Government of National Unity (sworn in in
1990), Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and the
8

dimensions of state power, we believe they will have limited impact on civil war adversaries' calculus regarding the costs and benefits of adopting democracy as a form of conflict
management.

9

Figure I.I is based on an analysis of ninety civil war settlements. There arc u7 civil war
settlements in the dataset we employ to analyze the effects of power sharing on democracy.
A number of these settlements drop out of our analysis because the countries revert to
armed conflict less than a year after the end of the original conflict.

Introduction

The Critics' View

rival United Liberian Movement for Democracy constituting the government. Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces in the country, fighting
resumed and presidential elections were never held.
Yet another effort to end the civil war, the r996 Abuja Accords, called
for three forms of power sharing - political, military, and economic. In
this instance, the peace held long enough for elections to be held in
July r997. Because the electoral process was judged to have been "free,
fair and transparent, " 9 Liberia is understood to have made the transition
to minimalist democracy in that year. The fact that Liberians voted overwhelmingly for Taylor, a warlord with a reputation for brutality, attests
to the feelings of insecurity that prevailed in the country at that time. As
Pham (2004, r7 5) observes, the electoral outcome "could perhaps best be
explained by the fact that the electorate faced an uncertain security situation and made a reasoned choice for the candidate who was most likely to
maximize the possibility for stability and, eventually, improved
conditions."
This instance of minimalist democracy as a form of conflict management proved short-lived as Liberia returned to full-scale civil war in r999.
The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the war in
2003, also called for political, military, and economic power sharing.
Following a period of two years during which the National Transitional
Government of Liberia ruled the country, general elections were held in
2005 with the country again making a transition to minimalist democracy
in the following year.
Power sharing is by no means a panacea for the challenges that states
emerging from civil war confront. We agree with critics of power sharing
that the adoption of those measures by states ending intrastate conflicts
has not been followed by the emergence of liberal democracy. We disagree, however, with those who attribute the failure of liberal democracy
solely or primarily to the presence of power-sharing institutions. Rather,
we maintain that in light of the challenging nature of the post-civil war
environment, it is not surprising that liberal democracy has failed to take
root. Post-civil war settings are characterized by insecurity and uncertainty, conditions that constitute a powerful obstacle to the adoption of
democracy. It is precisely in this type of situation that power-sharing
institutions are most likely to be adopted. By taking into account the

conditions under which civil war actors arc most likely to take up power
sharing, we show the potential that power sharing has for exercising
a positive effect on the development of democracy.
Additionally, we make a point often overlooked by critics, that powersharing institutions can help establish important underpinnings and
habits of democracy and encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Seen from this perspective, power sharing is not incompatible with democracy in post-civil war states. Rather, we argue, power-sharing institutions
are a critical component in the process of facilitating the emergence of
minimalist democracy, the form of democracy one can most reasonably
expect to take root under pose-civil war conditions. Devised as a political
response to the concerns of actors emerging from civil war, power-sharing
institutions thus should be considered part of the art of the possible in
post-civil war states.

IO
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Per Friends of Liberia Special Elections Preliminary Statement of Findings, July 23, 1997,
accessed at www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgem_Action/apic_81697.html. Friends of Liberia
served as a neutral and independent observer in the special election.

II

THE C RITIC S' VIEW: POWER SHARING AS AN OBSTACLE
TO THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY

Power-sharing institutions have become an increasingly prominent feature of civil war settlements since the end of the Cold War. Power-sharing
measures have been incorporated into settlements with the expectation
that they would help end the fighting and provide a means of stabilizing
the peace. By offering assurances that a majority cannot dominate government power, power-sharing institutions provide former civil war adversaries, particularly those who represent the interests of ideological or
ethnic minority communities, with the sense of security necessary to
support the postwar peace process (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).
Table r.r documents the dramatic change in the number of civil war
settlements that contain power-sharing measures as part of the terms of
the settlement. It identifies the number of civil wars ended in each decade
following the end of World War ll as well as the percentage of settlements
of those civil wars calling for one or more of the four forms of power
sharing - political, military, territorial, and economic - noted earlier.
As the growing trend in the proportion of civil war settlements calling
for some form of power sharing makes clear, power sharing has become
the favored means by which civil wars are brought to a peaceful conclusion. Finlay (2011, 1) notes that scholars now view power sharing as the
...dominant' or 'default' response of the international community when it
comes to conflict resolution." This status as the preferred means of ending
civil wars is further underscored by the fact that the United Nations now
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Table 1. l Trends in the use of power sharing as a means of ending civil wars,
1945-2006

identified as limiting the potential for democracy to emerge by removing
issues that should be subject to political debate from the political decisionmaking process (Roeder and Rothchild 2005 ) . Finally, power sharing has
been characterized as impeding the emergence of democracy by distributing state power solely among armed actors. The concern critics raise in
this instance is that by focusing only on formerly warring groups, powersharing agreements will have the effect of excluding other parties from
participation in government (Jarstad 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2010).
Burundi's power-sharing agreement, based as it is on minority overrepresentation, serves as a useful example of these criticisms. Having
experienced a number of civil wars between the minority Tutsi and the
majority Hutu, warring elites signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement in 2000. A number of the agreement's provisions were
designed to guarantee political participation by the minority Tutsi population, given that their prospects for winning competitive elections were
viewed as slim. One power-sharing measure, for example, specifies that
the country's Senate must consist of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi
representatives. The likelihood that such an outcome would be achieved
was enhanced further by the introduction of an article in the 2005 constitution that specified a mechanism to correct imbalances produced
through the electoral process (Lemarchand 2006).
Burundi's peace agreement also contained a number of provisions
allocating positions within the military and the bureaucracy, measures
designed to depoliticize decisions regarding distribution of those elements
of state power. One central measure, designed to address the deep mistrust
the Hutu majority had of the armed forces, which previously had been
controlled by the Tutsi minority, called for the integration of government
and rebel forces in the new military. Sixty percent of the officers were to be
drawn from the government army and 40 percent from the rebel Forces
for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). In addition, no single ethnic group
was to constitute more than 50 percent of the defense and security forces
(Nantulya 2015, n.p.).
Finally, the government produced by Burundi's power-sharing agreement proved inclusive as a number of armed groups that refused to sign the
original accord in 2000 later signed ceasefire agreements with the government and were incorporated into the country's power-sharing institutions.
One month after the Arusha Agreement was signed in August 2000 by the
government and sixteen armed movements or political parties, three Tutsi
political parties signed on to the agreement, followed by the largest Hutu
party, the CNDD-FDD, in December 2002; the National Liberation Forces
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Decade War Ended
1945-1949
I95os
I96os
I970S
I98os
r99os
2000-2006

Number of Civil Wars
Ended in Decade

Number of Settlements
Calling for Power Sharing

7
II
10
2I

2 (28.5 % )
2 (18%)
T (10%)
8 (38%)
6 (46%)

13
46
19

-

34 (74% )
15 (79%)

typically includes a power-sharing expert among the members of the
Department of Political Affairs' Mediation Support Unit Standby Team
(McCrudden and O'Leary 2013, 4).
The security-enhancing and stabilizing effects of power sharing come at
the cost of allowing the majority's will occasionally to be frustrated.
Noting this, critics of power sharing maintain that establishing power
sharing after civil war requires the acceptance of a disquieting trade-off:
fostering peace while simultaneously placing limits on the competitive
nature of democratic systems. In the view of some scholars, actors who
opt to include power-sharing institutions as part of civil war settlements
face making a choice "between efforts to promote democracy versus
efforts to secure peace" (Jarstad 2008, 18). Since, in the context of contemporary civil wars, the driving motivation for adopting power sharing
has been to end armed conflict and to stabilize the postwar regime, those
who hold this position believe that postwar societies' ability to make
a transition to democracy is necessarily compromised.
More specifically, the critics of power sharing have advanced three
central claims regarding the constraining effects power sharing is said to
have on the ability of states that adopt such measures to make a transition
to democracy. First, in those instances in which power-sharing agreements
provide guaranteed positions in government to the leaders of minority
groups, the ability of voters to use elections to hold politicians accountable for their decisions is presumed to be hindered. This is thought to shortcircuit one of the fundamental virtues of democracy (Tull and Mehler
2005; Jarstad 2008). Second, power-sharing measures that call for allocating state resources on the basis of a set formula also have been
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in 2005; and the Paliphehutu-FNL in 2006 (Peace Accords Matrix). Parties
lacking affiliation with the former rebel groups have been able to compete in
elections and win seats in Parliament.
As Burundi illustrates, critics have valid points regarding the ways in
which power sharing may inhibit states from making the transition to
a form of democracy with a fully open political system. By design, many
power-sharing measures impose constraints on the competitive nature of
democratic systems. Should power sharing thus be considered an obstacle
to democratization? We acknowledge that the answer to this question is,
in part, a matter of perspective. Those who value majority rule are likely to
answer in the affirmative; those interested in the principle of inclusion are
likely co see power sharing as a means of advancing democracy. Bue
analyses of whether power sharing impedes or facilitates democratization
in post-civil war states should be based on more than a preference for
majoritarian or consensus systems of democracy. The post-civil war context is unique and due consideration must be given to the challenges
associated with fostering democracy in chis environment. We provide
a brief overview of our argument regarding the pernicious effects insecurity has on democratization next, with further elaboration of our reasoning
and evidence in the chapters that follow.

state resources. Leaders, in turn, are motivated to either retain or gain
state power not only to avoid the potential for retributive violence but also
to ensure their own political survival (Smith and McGillivray 2006). In
this context, the representatives of minority groups, recognizing their
disadvantage in any democratic contest that empowers majorities, have
little motivation to participate in elections that will almost certainly hand
control of the state over to their opponents.
If civil war rivals are co be convinced about the value of adopting
democracy as a means of conflict management, they muse be guaranteed
that the power of the state will not be used by the victors of an election in
a manner detrimental to their survival. The problem, of course, is how to
ensure that such a commitment is credible (Fearon 1995). One possible
means of securing this goal is to provide third-party guarantees. If, as
Walter (1997) argues, third-party guarantees can help adversaries surmount the feelings of "extreme vulnerability" (33 8) and "anxiety about
future security" (339) that often impede them from negotiating an end to
a civil war, cannot such guarantees also be used to provide sufficient
assurances for rivals to consider making a transition to democracy?
A growing body of scholarship on the effects of UN peacekeeping
operations has offered mixed evidence regarding the proposition that thirdparty guarantees can promote democracy. On the positive side of the ledger,
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Joshi (2010) find chat UN peace operations
increase the likelihood of post-conflict democratization. Steinert and
Grimm (2015, 530) and Flores and Nooruddin (2016, 190) show that
only UN peacekeeping operations that include what they term, respectively,
"democracy-promoting components" and a "mandate" to monitor elections have a positive impact on democratization. On the other hand, Fortna
(z.oo8a) and Gurses and Mason (2008) find no empirical support for
a relationship between peacekeeping forces and democratization.
W~ile multilateral peace operations may, in at least some cases, have
served to ease some of the security concerns experienced by civil war
rivals, a number of factors are likely to limit civil war actors' willingness
to rely on third parties as guarantors of their security and thus to adopt
democracy as a form of conflict management in the absence of other
assurances. For one, as a review of multilateral peacekeeping makes
clear, "[p]eacekeeping forces have indeed not always been able, and
have sometimes been unwilling, to adequately contribute to the protection of the civilian population. Operations often do not have sufficient
capacity and commanders are often reluctant to risk the lives of troops"
(Briscoe et al. 2015, 27). Additionally, minority groups are aware that

14

THE POST-CIVIL WAR ENVIRONMENT: INSECURITY
AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIZATION

Civil war has been characterized as opening a window of opportunity for
institutional change, including the possible adoption of democracy
(Correll and Peterson 1999). Although intrastate conflict has a potential
role to play in shaping the creation of democratic institutions, clearly not
all civil wars have been followed by a transition to democratic political
systems (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). We contend that the failure on the
part of many countries to make a transition to democracy is not surprising
given the very difficult environment with which actors emerging from civil
war must contend. While foreign aid and other forms of assistance from
the international community can help countries address some of these
problems, they are unlikely to help overcome them completely.
A major impediment to democratization in post-civil war states is the
pervasive sense of insecurity that defines the post-conflict environment.
Fearing threats to their survival, followers of rival groups typically support the efforts of their leaders to maintain or gain control of state power
to minimize the danger posed by an adversary's potential dominance of
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peacekeeping forces will only be deployed for a limited period of time.
Once peacekeepers leave, what protection do minority groups have in
a political system where the majority may well come to power through
elections?
If third-party guarantees are unable to provide civil war rivals with
sufficient assurances of their security to convince them to adopt democracy as a form of conflict management, can power sharing be relied upon
to provide the type of credible commitment that actors emerging from civil
war seek? We turn to this issue next, touching on power-sharing institutions' capacity to stabilize the peace and lay the groundwork for democratization by addressing civil war adversaries' apprehensions.

community to entities that are increasingly constrained by the rule of law.
The rule of law, understood to be transparent, publicly announced rules
that are binding on the government, enables citizens t0 understand when
and how state authorities will use their coercive powers. Power-sharing
measures have the potential to contribute to the development of the rule of
Jaw both by acting as a check on the power of the executive and by
fragmenting authority. Countries in which a single group previously
controlled the governing apparatus are transformed as representatives of
rival communities now occupy positions of authority. The result is
a rudimentary system of checks and balances, a crude but functiona l
rule of law system that serves to constrain governments' ability to abuse
their citizens.
Power sharing also has the capacity to exercise an influence on social
groups and thus to promote democratization from below. This occurs
through t he impact that power sharing has on the distribution of two sets
of factors that impact groups' ability to engage in the political process:
access to power and access to resources. Depending on the particular types
of power-sharing measures that are included in a civil war settlement,
power sharing can be expected to produce greater equality in the distribution of one or both of these factors across groups. Power sharing promotes
democratization by empowering formerly marginalized groups, thus
enabling communities that were discriminated against or too weak or
poor to participate effectively to take part in the political process.
The theory we develop in this book predicts that countries that agree to
create power-sharing institutions as a means of ending their civil wars
have a much better chance of making a transition to minimalist democracy
than those that fail to embrace such measures. We evaluate our argument
concerning the relationship between power sharing and a postwar country's political system using a number of different statistical tests based on
data for fifty-nine countries that fought and ended civil wars between
1945 and 2006. Our initial examination is of the effects power sharing has
on post-civil war democracy. In keeping with our central argument, we
consider the impact power sharing has on the transition to or onset of
minimalist democracy.
We then turn to a number of tests to examine the effects that power
sharing has on democratization after civil war. To that end, we examine
the impact that extensive power sharing has on countries' movement
along various indices of democracy in the years following the end of
their civil wars. This approach to evaluating post-conflict democracy is
the one that has been employed most frequently by scholars who have

POWER SHARING, DEMOCRACY, AND DEMOCRATIZATI ON
IN POST-CIVIL WAR STATES

Although the central purpose for which power-sharing institutions are
designed is to help end civil wars by providing adversaries with means of
enhancing their security once they lay down their arms, these arrangements, we argue, also affect the potential for democracy to emerge. Powersharing institutions enhance the likelihood that adversaries will consider
adopting democracy by providing them with a guarantee that should they
lose an election, they will retain a means of ensuring that their opponent
will not be able to use the powers of the state to target them. These
assurances should be most strongly felt in those post-civil war states
that adopt an array of power-sharing mechanisms. For this reason, we
anticipate that the transition to a minimalist form of democracy is most
likely in those states that are associated with extensive power sharing.
The security-enhancing effects of power sharing play an important role
in the process of democratization by persuading formerly warring groups
to contemplate using elections as a means of managing conflict. Power
sharing also directly influences democratic change following civil war, we
argue, via its influences on both a country's government and its citizens.
Our identification of these processes, which we refer to, respectively, as
democratization from above and democratization from below, complements recent case study and comparative work examining the role that
elite competition from above plays in the process of democratization, as
well as cross-national studies focusing on democratization from below
(Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010).
We conceive of democratization from above occurring as governments
are transformed from instruments of oppression in the hands of a single
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analyzed transitions to democracy following civil war. We adopt this as
a measure of democratization given that the focus is on incremental
movement toward (or away from) some established form of democracy.
In an effort to provide a point of comparison with our examination of the
impact that extensive power sharing has on the transition to minimalist
democracy, we focus on the effects these institutions have on movement
along indices of electoral, liberal, and egalitarian democracy.
We also evaluate the influence that power sharing has on the rule of
law, a factor that we identify as encouraging the emergence of minimalist
democracy via democratization from above. Additionally, we examine the
effects that power sharing has on the distribution of power among groups
and the distribution of resources among individuals and groups, factors
that we view as contributing to democratization from below.

democracy are such that it is understood to be exceedingly difficult to
accomplish both of these goals simultaneously. The notion that tension
exists between stability and democracy in states emerging from civil war is
one that we acknowledge in this book. However, we seek to provide
a more nuanced picture of the so-called trade-off between peace and
democracy by emphasizing the sense of insecurity that impedes democratization. Looked at from this perspective, if means can be designed to
address civil war actors' sense of insecurity, there need not necessarily be
a trade-off between peace and democracy, particularly if the latter is
defined on the basis of minimalist, rather than liberal, democracy.
Central to our efforts to achieve the goals previously described are three
tasks that we take on in chapters of this book. The first is to call attention
to the environment in which efforts to democratize are taking place, an
issue we address in Chapter 4. While a great deal has been written about
the difficulties of democracy promotion in states that lack functioning
institutions, legitimacy, and public values, less attention has been given to
the sense of insecurity that prevails in countries emerging from civil war. ' 0
As we seek to emphasize, countries in which insecurity is rife are the ones
in which a democratic transition is least likely to take place.
Understanding the role that insecurity plays in the postwar environment
and the manner in which a concern for survival shapes the views and
actions of civil war rivals is critical. Democracy can be fostered in postconfl ict states, but doing so requires the design of institutions that mitigate
insecurity while supporting some degree of competition in the selection of
governments.
Our second task is to elucidate the complementary relationship that we
posit exists between power-sharing institutions and some facets of democracy. Because much of the existing research on the relationship between
power sharing and democracy has been focused solely on the negative
aspects of these political arrangements, this has had the unfortunate
consequence of blinding scholars to the potential benefits to democracy
that may also be present with the adoption of these institutions. Although
power-sharing institutions themselves are not inherently democratic, they
provide former belligerents with the security assurances necessary to
encourage them to play by the electoral rules of the game. By providing

GOALS OF THE BOOK

As noted earlier in this chapter, one of the central goals of this volume is to
temper some of the pessimism that exists regarding the capacity of democracy to promote stability and order in post-civil war states. In this study,
we seek to demonstrate that it is possible for a form of democracy to
emerge in states that have experienced the trauma of civil war. This is not,
however, the liberal democracy that we often associate with consolidated
democracies. We instead contend that the best that can be hoped for in the
context of postwar insecurity is a form of minimalist democracy in which
free-and-fair elections are regularly held.
While this may not sound particularly appealing as an outcome for
a post-civil war state, it is worth keeping in mind that liberal democracy
was not the starting point for any of the mature democracies currently in
existence. Liberal democratic practices evolved from much more limited
forms of popular participation. Toscano et al. (2012, 3) articulate this
perspective in the following terms:
We seem ro have forgotten that democracy has been the late fruit of a long and
difficult process of rule secting and power limitation. T he Magna Carra of 1215
was definitely nor a democratic document, but a pact between a sovereign and
a group of what today we would call "warlords" aimed at reducing conflict
through common acceptance of rules and limitations .... Democracy comes after
the law and on the basis of shared rules, not vice versa.

A further ambition of this book is to elaborate upon what has been
termed the "peace-democracy trade-off" Uarstad and Sisk 2008). In postwar states, the tensions between promoting stability and fostering
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'" To the extent that this issue has been considered, the focus has been either on reforms of
the state security sector (e.g., Brinkerhoff i.007 and Licklider 2.014 ) or the provision of
security by outside actors as a means of convincing nval elites to agree and stick ro the
peace (Walter 2.00J.).
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what amounts to forms of insurance, power sharing can help facilitate the
emergence of democracy. We address this issue in Chapters 2 and 4.
The third task we undertake is to disaggregate the concept of
democracy. In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, we highlight the need to look
beyond the abstract concept of democracy writ large and instead
consider different variants and elements of democracy. In an effort to
evaluate the potential that power-sharing institutions have to facilitate
the emergence of democracy, we distinguish its effects on minimalist or
Schumpeterian democracy, electoral democracy, liberal democracy,
and egalitarian democracy.
We further examine the impact that power sharing has on various
components of democracy ranging from the rule of law to the degree of
equality in the distribution of resources among groups. Disaggregating
democracy allows us co determine not only whether power sharing helps
countries emerging from civil war make a transition to minimalist
democracy but also to focus on whether or not it helps effect changes
that could help stabilize minimalist democracy. While such an approach
necessarily inhibits the development of a single grand theory regarding
the relationship between power sharing and democracy, it does have the
benefit of enhancing the precision and clarity of claims about exactly
how power sharing shapes the political trajectory of a pose-civil war
state.

Chapter 4 advances our argument regarding the importance of focus ing on insecurity as a characteristic of the pose-conflict environment.
Throughout the chapter, we support our argument regarding the central
role that issues of insecurity and survival (physical, cultural, and political)
play in states emerging from civil war with references to a variety of cases
and survey evidence from countries that have experienced civil war. We
then introduce our theory of the effects power sharing has on the transition to minimalist democracy.
Part II consists of three empirical chapters that analyze the effects
power-sharing institutions have on different variants and components of
democracy. In Chapter 5, we examine the effect that extensive powersharing arrangements have on the onset of minimalist democracy following civil war. Employing measures for electoral, liberal, and egalitarian
democracy drawn from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, we also
consider the effect that power sharing has on democratization during
pose-civil war peace spells.
Chapter 6 then investigates the capacity power sharing has co facilitate
democratization "from above" by encouraging the emergence of the rule
of law, with the result that government is constrained from abusing its
citizens. Chapter 7 complements this analysis with tests of power sharing's
impact on democratization "from below," including the impact powersharing institutions have on equality in the distribution of political power
among groups and equality in the distribution of resources among groups.
We characterize these changes from above and from below as transformacive effects as they constitute changes in institutions and in the distribution of political and economic power that allow for the development of
behaviors that are consistent with democracy.
Our concluding chapter offers a review of our findings, engages with
challenges to our argument, suggests avenues for future research on
democracy in post-civil war states, and addresses the policy implications
chat seem from our analyses.
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The remainder of chis book is organized as follows. Part I contextualizes
our argument. Chapter 2 offers an overview of existing research concerning the relationship benveen power sharing and democracy. Here we note
chat power sharing, once understood to be the mechanism through which
democracy could be cultivated in deeply divided societies, is now criticized
for being insufficiently democratic. We argue chat there are advantages to
disaggregating the concept of democracy co examine where power sharing
has potential benefits and potential harms.
In Chapter 3, we elaborate on the concepts and measures chat are
associated with our central focus: power sharing and democracy. We
provide examples of power-sharing measures chat have been included in
peace settlements, elaborating on the distribution of the different forms of
power sharing following civil war. We also examine current practices in
terms of the use of power sharing and efforts to promote democracy in
pose-civil war states.
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